Enter the tank

Peter Simkins

The weeks between mid-July and mid-September brought a change in tactical conditions on the Somme, from siege-type operations to semi-open warfare, in which the Germans often occupied irregular lines of loosely connected shell-holes rather than continuous trenches. After Hindenburg and Ludendorff had replaced Falkenhayn in late August, there was a further shift towards elastic defence in depth, with the German forward positions even more thinly manned.

Mark I (Female) tank A11

Click to enlarge

The British were now using the creeping barrage with greater frequency but it was also becoming imperative for the British and Dominion infantry to vary their tactics, placing less emphasis upon linear ‘waves' and more upon the employment of small groups of men who could work their way forward with their own close-support weapons – much in the manner of the assault detachments and storm troops favoured increasingly by the Germans. British infantry platoons and companies needed additional integrated firepower to make them more self-reliant and able to infiltrate between strongpoints instead of invariably carrying out frontal assaults. British gunners likewise continued to place too much faith in prolonged heavy bombardments and centrally controlled fire programmes which were, in fact, inappropriate in attacks on dispersed or thinly-held enemy positions. These developments, and the nature of Haig's ‘wearing-out ‘ battle, were not instantly understood by all British divisional commanders and staffs as they strained to prepare more ‘line-straightening' actions designed to secure improved jumping-off positions for the next big set-piece assault on a major German defensive system.

Haig faced growing criticism from politicians at home who felt that the limited progress made to date did not justify the dreadful casualties being suffered. The pressure on him to achieve more substantial results from his projected offensive in mid-September was therefore all the greater. Ready to believe the advice of his Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier-General Charteris, that the Germans were approaching exhaustion, Haig was optimistic that a breakthrough might now be forthcoming, especially as his planned large-scale set-piece attack to make on the German third main position would be bolstered by a new weapon, the tank, which had been conceived by Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Swinton in 1914 as an armoured, tracked vehicle capable of crossing trenches and barbed wire and of destroying enemy machine guns. Swinton had warned against employing tanks in ‘driblets' but Haig was keen to use them to deal with separate strongpoints and fortified villages that might otherwise hold up the advancing infantry. He and Rawlinson consequently deployed them along the battle line rather than sending them in to action in one concentrated body.

Haig hoped and anticipated that the breakthrough would be effected by fresh infantry divisions and by the artillery, the density of guns being double that of 1 July though less than half that used for 14 July. As the commander of Fourth Army, which had the principal role, Rawlinson had proposed attacking in stages on three successive nights. He was overruled by Haig, who wanted a bolder attack with no pauses and after Fourth Army's failures in August, Rawlinson was in a weak position to argue his case.

The attack, which began on 15 September, was designed to capture the German third system at Flers, followed by Morval, Lesboeufs and Gueudecourt. The Canadian Corps, part of the Reserve Army to Rawlinson's left, was ordered to seize Courcelette. Forty-nine tanks were assigned to support the infantry on the morning of the attack but only 36 arrived at their starting points. Assisted by a creeping barrage, they caused some alarm and losses among the German defenders and in the British 41st Division's sector, four tanks reached Flers. One of these advanced up the main street of the village while the others engaged machine-gun nests and strongpoints on the western and eastern outskirts. Horne's XV Corps took Flers and the Canadian Corps captured Courcelette, while Martinpuich and High Wood were also secured. Overall, however, on 15 September the gains were restricted to some 2,500 yards on a front of less than three miles. Lesboeufs and Morval held out for a further ten days and Combles and Gueudecourt did not fall until 26 September. Yet again the British offensive became bogged down and the oft-promised breakthrough appeared as far away as ever.

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Preparing for the Somme (Part 1)
The bloody first day (Part 2)
Summer on the Somme (Part 3)
Enter the tank (Part 4)
The reckoning (Part 5)

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