Summer on the Somme

Aviator’s view of a textbook British trench system on the Somme, May–June 1916

For the BEF, 1 July 1916 was undeniably the low point of the entire war. There were many more mistakes, costly setbacks and crises to come, but from that day Haig's forces on the Western Front showed clear signs of a genuine 'learning curve': the subsequent improvements in organisation, command, equipment, tactics and techniques would place the BEF at the cutting edge of the Allied armies in 1918. In the high summer of 1916, however, operations on the Somme seemed to offer the front line troops nothing but unending sacrifice. With the slogging match at Verdun already in its fifth month, there could be no question of halting the Somme offensive after only one day. During July Haig began to drop thoughts of a swift breakthrough and to view the Somme fighting more in terms of a 'wearing-out' battle, laying the foundations for a new decisive attack, possibly in mid-September. On the other side, Falkenhayn decreed on 2 July that not one foot of ground should be surrendered, an order which helped initiate the incessant round of British attacks and German counter-attacks that characterised the Somme in 1916.

As July wore on, Gough's Reserve Army took over the northern half of the British zone on the Somme, its junction with Fourth Army running just to the south, or right, of the Albert-Bapaume road. Haig rejected Joffre's pleas for him to renew the assault in the tricky central sector of his front from Thiepval to Pozières and decided instead to try to exploit the early gains on his right, near Montauban. Accordingly, between 2 and 13 July Rawlinson's Fourth Army tried to take Contalmaison, Mametz Wood and Trones Wood to secure the flanks of a forthcoming attack on the German second main position. Overcoming the reservations of Haig and the French, Rawlinson and the New Army units gave a glimpse of their true capabilities when, on 14 July - after a challenging night assembly in No Man's Land - a 6,000-yard section of the German second position between Bazentin le Petit and Longueval was seized in a few hours. This brilliant feat, which owed much to a more intense artillery bombardment than that before 1 July, had a disappointing sequel. At Delville Wood, near Longueval, the South African Brigade of the 9th (Scottish) Division lost over 2,300 of its 3,153 officers and men in a bitter struggle that lasted from 14 to 21 July. The wood was not completely in British hands until 27 August, while neighbouring High Wood, seemingly empty of German troops on the morning of 14 July, finally fell to Rawlinson two months later, on 15 September.

The Reserve Army, meanwhile, strove to capture the village of Pozières, which, from its dominating position on the Albert-Bapaume road, provided an alternative line of approach into the rear of the Thiepval defences. The Australian divisions of I Anzac Corps underlined their excellent fighting reputation by capturing both the village and the fortified ruins of the windmill on the crest of the ridge beyond by 5 August, but subsequent efforts to move north-west from a constricted salient in the direction of Mouquet Farm and Thiepval were subjected to concentrated German artillery fire. Having suffered some 23,000 casualties in five weeks, the Australians were unsurprisingly critical of Gough's penchant for narrow-front attacks, while a calamitous subsidiary operation at Fromelles on 19/20 July - in which the 5th Australian Division was involved - further diminished Australian confidence in the British High Command. To the south, Rawlinson did his best to assist the French Sixth Army as it crept towards Péronne, but the Fourth Army was unable to capture Guillemont and Ginchy until 3 and 9 September respectively, and Rawlinson was left in no doubt about Haig's dissatisfaction with repeated attacks by inadequate forces on narrow frontages.

Command errors, mounting losses and relentless demands on front line troops were also to be found on the German side of the wire. Falkenhayn's order that from 11 July a strict defensive posture should be maintained at Verdun was a sure indication that British operations on the Somme were having some effect. His insistence on a tactical system of unyielding linear defence and immediate counter-attack - a policy backed by General Fritz von Below of the German Second Army - only added to the strain felt by German divisions. Given less time for rest, reorganisation and training between actions, the strength and quality of German formations began a slow but inexorable decline. The morale of German reinforcements arriving on the Somme correspondingly slumped in the face of the growing Allied superiority in matériel.

Go to next part

Preparing for the Somme (Part 1)
The bloody first day (Part 2)
Summer on the Somme (Part 3)
Enter the tank (Part 4)
The reckoning (Part 5)

Developed by asperyconsulting.com