The reckoning

The Battle of the Somme, July – November 1916 Click to enlarge

Haig has frequently been censured by historians and military commentators for using tanks prematurely at Flers-Courcelette on 15 September and for deploying them in 'penny packets' rather than in mass formation. Both charges are unfair. Had its debut been postponed, there was no guarantee that this untried weapon would then have proved more successful. The Mark I tanks of 1916 were slow and unreliable and it might have been an even more serious blunder to commit them on a large scale before their merits and shortcomings had been fully exposed under battle conditions. It is also often forgotten that Britain was fighting as part of a coalition: that same day Allied offensives were proceeding in Transylvania and on the Italian Front as well as in the French zone of operations on the Somme to the south of the BEF. Haig might therefore be forgiven for reasoning that, should all go well, a second opportunity to employ tanks might not actually arise. Contrary to popular belief, he was certainly no reactionary so far as weapons technology was concerned. His enthusiasm for new ideas, and his personal intervention at critical moments, encouraged the development and successful tactical application of Lewis guns, Mills bombs, trench mortars, gas and aircraft as well as that of tanks.

Criticism of Haig for prolonging the British offensive on the Somme after mid-September is perhaps more justified. His persistence seems to have been motivated by the firm belief that the German Army would indeed eventually collapse provided that the BEF and its allies did not relax their constant pressure.

In the last week of September - while the Fourth Army was attacking towards Morval, Lesboeufs, Gueudecourt and Combles - Gough's Reserve Army undertook its biggest operation so far, assaulting the German positions from Courcelette to the Schwaben Redoubt. Mouquet Farm was captured by the British 11th Division on the opening day of Gough's attack, 26 September. The thorough battle training and briefing given by Ivor Maxse to his 18th Division paid off, as it cleared Thiepval village early on 27 September. However, it took until 13 October before the 39th Division was able to eject the last stubborn defenders from the Schwaben Redoubt.

On the right flank of the Reserve Army the Canadian Corps became embroiled in a furious fight for Regina Trench which dragged on until 10 November. On the Fourth Army's front, as rain turned the battlefield into a muddy swamp, Rawlinson's divisions inched painfully towards Le Transloy and secured Le Sars on 7 October.

The last phase of the Somme offensive was carried out by Gough's Fifth Army - as the Reserve Army was renamed - between 13 and 24 November. In spite of several postponements and appalling conditions, the operation was allowed to go ahead in the hope that a late success would create a favourable impression at the inter-Allied conference at Chantilly , which Haig was to attend on 15/16 November. It was hoped also that the attack would have benefits for the Russian and Romanian fronts by dissuading the Germans from switching reserves from France

A corporal `bomber' of the 1/4th Battalion, Gordon Highlanders at the time of the Ancre battle, 1916. Click to enlarge

The Fifth Army's assault on 13 November was delivered astride the River Ancre, north of Thiepval, and was intended to reduce or eliminate the German-held salient between Serre and the Albert-Bapaume road. Employing a creeping barrage, and an overhead heavy machine-gun barrage by Vickers guns, the 51st (Highland) Division captured Beaumont Hamel, and the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division seized Beaucourt. However, Serre - which had been an objective on 1 July - was still occupied by the Germans when Haig brought the offensive to an end. The BEF remained some three miles from Bapaume; all its exertions and sacrifices during the previous four-and-a-half months had resulted in territorial gains measuring about 20 miles wide and six miles deep.

The British and Dominion forces on the Somme suffered a terrifying total of 419,654 casualties. The French, though still short of Péronne, had gained over twice as much ground as the BEF for 204,253 losses - about half the cost. Estimates of German casualties vary hugely - between 237,000 and 680,000. However, statistics alone do not tell the whole story. There was increasing evidence of more progressive tactical thinking in the BEF, with outstanding division and brigade commanders like Maxse of the 18th Division and Solly-Flood of the 35th Brigade urging the adoption of flexible assault formations, meticulous battle training and greater use of Lewis guns and rifle grenades to boost the infantry's own firepower in the attack. The appointment - with Haig's active support - of a civilian expert, Sir Eric Geddes, as Director-General of Transportation at GHQ in September set in train a reorganisation of the BEF's logistics that would eventually pay rich dividends.

The German Army knew that it had been hurt by the improving BEF. On 21 September a Hindenburg memorandum stated that the Somme front was all-important and would have first claim on available divisions. Ludendorff himself admitted that the Army 'had been fought to a standstill and was utterly worn out' and Crown Prince Rupprecht - who faced the BEF for most of the war - observed that what remained of the 'old first-class, peace-trained German infantry had been expended on the battlefield'.

1. Preparing for the Somme (Part 1)
2. The bloody first day (Part 2)
3. Summer on the Somme (Part 3)
4. Enter the tank (Part 4)
5. The reckoning (Part 5)

© 2006 Osprey Publishing Ltd, The First World War - The war to end all wars