Raids

Stephen Bull

British Raiders, 1916–18 Click to enlarge

It is claimed that the very first trench raid occurred as early as 4 October 1914, when a platoon of 1st Bn Coldstream Guards under Lt.Beckwith Smith rushed an enemy sap at Troyon Factory Road. In February 1915 Gen.Sir John French called for 'constant activity' even though the army stood on the defensive. At about the same time the history of 2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers describes how the commanding officer 'kept alive the fighting spirit' of the battalion by means of 'patrols' intended to deny No Man's Land to the enemy:

'Patrolling was done by an officer who was rarely accompanied by more than four to six men, often by only one. Knowledge of the enemy's wire, reliefs, troops and so on, was sought. The capture of an enemy patrol, a dead man's identification marks, overhearing talk and recognising dialect, aided intelligence'.

Many escapades aimed at snuffing out enemy listening posts ended in fights with rifles, pistols and bombs. In one of the larger skirmishes, on 12 March 1915, three officers and 21 men got close by bluff, using a German-speaking officer, and extricated themselves by whistle and lamp signals. In May 1915 the Canadians were reported as mounting many aggressive 'scouting patrols' led by NCOs. The 5th Bn Northumberland Fusiliers executed a three-man night patrol in August 1915 to investigate a screen that the enemy had erected, but were sprayed with machine gun fire. Another group of seven went to their aid, and were lucky that there was only one fatality. Such exploits by aggressive units helped to develop small unit tactics. They added trench knives, coshes, knobkerries, knuckledusters, blackened faces, pullovers, cap comforters and muffled boots to the close combat repertoire; but these early raids aimed only at local goals. Trench raids as an official instrument of policy were slower to evolve.

The raid adopted as a model for future action was by 5th and 7th Canadian Bns on the Douvre River on the night of 16 November 1915; its keynote was minute preparation. A copy of the front line was laid out and attacks, the building of 'blocks', the use of bridging ladders and mats for crossing wire were practised. Artillery, trench mortars and infantry were all co-ordinated, while the raiders themselves were divided into two 70-man groups. Within each of these groups were sections devoted to different tasks: five 'wire cutters'; two bombing and blocking groups, each with seven men; two bridge cover parties with three men each; a trench rifle group of ten; a listening post support group of 13; and a reserve of 22. This organisation ensured that once the enemy line had been penetrated bombing groups could attack down the trench in both directions, blocks being established to prevent counter-attack.

On the day of the raid artillery targeted a troublesome machine gun post, and the wire, but this was incompletely cut and after dark the task had to be completed by hand. During the raid one group was discovered by the enemy, drawing fire. The raiders replied with bombs but, being compromised, were forced to withdraw. The other group were entirely successful, stabbing a sentry before bombing dug-outs, taking prisoners, and withdrawing according to plan. Artillery co-operation worked well; throughout the proceedings German rear lines were shelled, but when the attackers retired the guns turned on the sector which had just been raided, deterring counter-attack. The cost to the Canadians had been just one man wounded, and another killed by a 'negligent discharge'.

From this time on Allied raiding became more frequent, and was sanctioned at the highest level. Haig had several good reasons for embracing what he called 'winter sports'. There was pressure from the French: they wanted him to attack, but he protested that as yet he had only a collection of 'divisions untrained for the field'. Raids would both help pacify the French, and bring practical experience without committing the army to a premature offensive. This activity also seemed to offer the prospect of wearing down the enemy and forcing him to keep substantial garrisons constantly alert.

Raids, euphemistically called 'minor enterprises', were now also accepted as the prime antidote to staleness, as Notes For Infantry Officers pointed out:

'There is an insidious tendency to lapse into a passive and lethargic attitude, against which officers and all ranks have to be on their guard, and the fostering of the offensive spirit, under such unfavourable conditions, calls for incessant attention. Minor local enterprises and constant occupation during the tour of duty in the trenches furnish the best means of maintaining the efficiency of the troops... Constant activity in harassing the enemy may lead to reprisals at first, and for this reason is sometimes neglected, but if persevered in, it always results in an ultimate mastery, it gives the troops a healthy interest and wholesome topics of conversation, and it achieves the double purpose of raising the morale of our own troops whilst lowering that of the enemy.'

It should not be assumed that the advantage always lay on the side of the raiders. Most 'enterprises' had mixed results, and many were bloody fiascos. At 'Y Sap' on the Somme on the night of 26 March 1916 , the 1st Dorsets threw 86 men forward under cover of a mine explosion. Two parties entered the German lines, but the enemy fled, calling down artillery and machine gun fire on their abandoned posts. The Dorsets suffered four dead and 17 wounded, some of whom were initially left behind and had to be perilously extracted. They claimed one German hit. On 2 June 1916, also on the Somme, 22nd Bn of the Manchesters launched a raid into uncut wire which resulted in 30 casualties, three of the four dead being plainly visible the next morning 'tangled in a heap' among the wire.

That very night, not far away at Serre, 14th Bn York & Lancasters made another raid optimistically claimed as a 'partial success'. This comprised three officers and 80 NCOs and men, and was intended to 'gain an information possible... secure prisoners and to increase the morale of our troops'. Preparation was reported to have been good, but the intense ten-minute bombardment was insufficient; moreover, an officer and several men were wounded by a 'premature'. A Bangalore torpedo supposed to blow a hole in the wire was too short, and the break-through was made with wire cutters. Then 'the detailed order of procedure appears to have broken down'. Just two officers and a dozen men got into the German trenches, and promptly became involved in a bombing duel. After three minutes the raiders were recalled. Three men were killed and four wounded; the luckiest of these was Pte.McKelvey, who was spotted out in No Man's Land the next morning and rescued by a comrade.

A multiple raid launched by 55th Division on 28 June 1916 in the vicinity of Blaireville Wood, also on the Somme, was suddenly exposed when its covering cloud of gas and smoke was blown away. When they were just 50 yards from the enemy trench, '... He opened out with machine guns, rifles and trench mortars. It was Hell let loose, but someone shouted “On the Kellys”, and on we went, but we were cut down like corn. The Jerrys were two deep in their trench, and we realised we were done. Sixteen men answered the roll call out of 76. The worst part of a stunt is always after, when they have a roll call. To stand there and listen to the names being called and try to answer “He's killed” – no one can picture it who hasn't seen one.'

The total proceeds of this raid was one German cap, and a Victoria Cross for a private who attempted to hold off the Germans during the retirement. As the Scottish trench proverb put it, 'Many a muddle means a medal'.

At Arrow Head Copse on 6 August 1916 two platoons of D Co, 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regt attempted to raid a ridge occupied by snipers, only to run into machine guns and shelling. Lieutenant Hague and two men were killed, and 25 wounded to no effect. In October and November 1916 the 10th & 11th Bns South Wales Borderers gained 'undisputed possession of No Man's Land' in their sector, but not without cost. In one raid Capt.Charlton surprised an enemy sap and 'disposed' of its six-man garrison, only to beat a hasty retreat before German reinforcements; Charlton and a private were killed, another officer wounded. On another raid Lt.Moore was wounded and was lucky to be retrieved by Sgt.Edwards. 12th Battalion of the same regiment had attempted a 30-man raid on the Maroc sector on 28 September, but were defeated by a combination of wire 45 feet wide, and the explosion of a small mine which threw them into disorder.

According to recent calculation there were a total of 310 trench raids made by the British alone during the battle of the Somme. Near Ypres Capt. Meysey-Thompson of the 21st Bn King's Royal Rifle Corps may well have been correct when he observed that there were so many raids that they only served to keep the enemy ready and alert to intercept them. Captain Henry Dundas recorded a complex raid by 1st Bn Scots Guards in early 1917 which involved crossing two canal lines, only to find that the Germans had already withdrawn, thus avoiding both bombardment and raiders.

Neither were the colonials immune to failure: at Celtic Wood in October 1917 only 14 of 80 Australian raiders would return unscathed. At Vimy the Canadians got into a vicious cycle of tit-for-tat raiding during the winter of 1916/17. In the first three weeks of December 1916 alone the Canadians received reports of 23 hostile patrols, and minor raids escalated into small battles. On 22 December the whole of the 1st Canadian Mounted Rifles attacked with over 400 men; but on the night of 28 February 1917 similar mass tactics met with disaster. A gas cloud blew back over the assembling raiders; the Germans, unsuppressed and alert, proceeded to mow down large parts of the Canadian 54th & 75th Bns, and a total of 687 casualties was reported, including both battalion commanders.

With raids an established part of trench warfare it is not surprising that the dress and equipment of raiders improved. Once troops had been content to discard equipment, fix bayonets, and turn their Service Dress caps backwards – being thus less likely to knock them off, and more likely to be taken for Germans. One A.S. Dolden of the London Scottish recorded that C and D Cos of that unit even made a raid in kilts, with bayonets dulled, and both 'faces and knees blackened'. As experience mounted, however, raiders often adopted a complete new outfit. 'Boiler' or 'crawling' suits made their appearance during 1916; and the Royal Army Clothing Department produced a sealed pattern 'Suit Overall Light Scout' in 1917. Photos of 1918 also show the use of a snow camouflage white boiler suit. The history of 1/4th Bn Loyal North Lancashires describes the night patrol attire as 'boiler suits and cap-comforters' with all identifying marks left behind.

Systematic raiding was addressed by the manual Scouting and Patrolling in December 1917. Under the heading of 'night patrols' it recommended that all night activities should be well planned, likely objectives being to gain information; to kill or take prisoners; or to protect an area. All patrollers were to accustom their eyes to the dark before going out, and patrols were to move in parts, leaving at least one man listening at any time. They should freeze when any flare was let off, and should return to their own lines cautiously and by a different route. Depending on how many men were in the patrol, different formations were recommended; and though small numbers were thought best, the larger patrols might include up to 20, complete with Lewis guns. In such an instance scouts would be put out ahead and a box formation of patrollers formed around the gun teams. For small patrols pairs might advance one behind the other, threes in a rough arrowhead. Tip-and-run bombing groups could be formed with a pair of bombers to the fore, and three men behind as a covering party. Equipment was an important consideration: 'Men on patrol should be lightly equipped. A cap-comforter is least visible, the face and hands should be darkened and gloves may be worn. Each man should carry two bombs, a bayonet or knobkerrie, and a revolver or rifle. A revolver is more convenient, but men so armed should be expert in its use. The rifle is best for purposes of protection. Scouts going out on patrol should have nothing on them which would assist the enemy if they were captured.' If all else failed the raider was encouraged to resort to 'hand to hand fighting and various jiu-jitsu methods of offence and self defence', as were taught in the Army Scouting Schools.

In 1916 German raiders are recorded as wearing 'attack order without greatcoat or cap, belts to be worn without pouches'. Perhaps more frightened of being shot by their own sentries, the Germans also experimented with triangles of white linen sewn to their jackets, and with 'white brassards' (see Elite 78, Plate I). Orders from 1917, however, suggest that white marks tended to be abandoned as impractical. Notes of Reserve-Infanterie Regiment Nr.261 refer to the carrying not only of pistols on lanyards, torches, flare pistols, daggers and trench clubs, but also of tent sections for removal of wounded and booty.

Like Allied efforts, German raids met with mixed results. In the flurry of raids at Vimy in mid-March 1917 there were at least two instances when alert Canadian sentries helped artillery and machine gun fire to decimate raiders before they reached their target. Yet in other actions Canadian 2nd Division lost 15 men, and two men went missing from an outpost. The Germans used similar techniques to the British, and could raid on a large scale, as the Americans of Co F, 16th Infantry famously discovered on the night of 2 November 1917 . As Cpl. Frank Coffman recalled: 'At three o'clock in the morning the Germans turned loose...several thousand shells. The only thing that prevented our platoon from being entirely wiped out was the fact that our trenches were deep, and the ground soft and muddy with no loose stones. After the shelling had lasted three-quarters of an hour the range was suddenly lifted in a half circle box barrage in our rear to prevent our supports coming up, and 240 Bavarians, the widely advertised cut throats of the German army, hopped down on us. The first raid on American troops was in full swing. They had crawled up to the wire under cover of their barrage and the moment it lifted were right on top of us'.

Two men were killed immediately; a third, Pte.Thomas Enright, was found on top of the parapet with his throat cut and a dozen bayonet wounds – it was assumed that he had been captured but had put up a struggle. Seven Americans were wounded, 11 captured: half the platoon was out of action.

© 2006 Osprey Publishing Ltd, World War I Trench Warfare (2) 1916–18
(Elite 84)