Preparing for the Somme

Peter Simkins

The German Army, The Somme 1916

By June 1916 the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) comprised well over a million men. Its 48 divisions were organised into five armies and included formations from Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Newfoundland and South Africa . This expansion was the product of colossal feats of improvisation in Britain and her Dominions since August 1914. The decline of voluntary recruiting had forced Britain to introduce conscription for single men in January 1916 and married men in May that year. However, compulsory service had not yet made an impact on the BEF, which, alone among the major armies in mid-1916, was still composed of volunteers. Many of these were in Territorial units or in the divisions of the 'New Armies' recruited in response to Kitchener 's appeals. The BEF's highly localised character was typified by its 'Pals' battalions, raised by civilian committees and made up of workmates, friends or men with a common social or geographical background. As the Territorials too were recruited from comparatively narrow geographical areas, in 1916 the BEF embraced many units which had close links with particular communities. Of the 247 infantry battalions that would be in the front line or immediate reserve on the Somme on 1 July, 141 were New Army formations. Though full of confident and enthusiastic volunteers, relatively few of these units had participated in a major battle. However, the New Zealand Division and the four Australian divisions that reached France by June did contain a fair nucleus of men who had seen action at Gallipoli.

The choice of the Somme region in Picardy for the Franco-British offensive in 1916 was largely determined by the fact that it marked the junction of the French and British forces. Its drawbacks were that no great strategic objectives, such as rail centres, lay close behind the German front and also that, because the sector had long been quiet, the Germans had constructed formidable defences in the Somme chalk, including dug-outs up to 40 feet below ground. Between February and June the demands of Verdun had reduced the French contribution to the Somme assault to only 11 divisions. For the first time in the war the British would therefore play the leading role in an Allied offensive on the Western Front.

Haig's intention was that, on the first day, Rawlinson's Fourth Army - created on 1 March - should take the German front defences from Serre to Montauban, then the German second position from Pozières to the Ancre and the slopes in front of Miraumont. The 46th and 56th Divisions, on the northern flank, would attempt to pinch out the German salient at Gommecourt in a diversionary operation. To their right, the 31st, 4th and 29th Divisions (VIII Corps) would attack between Serre and Beaumont Hamel. On the other side of the Ancre, the 36th (Ulster) and 32nd Divisions (X Corps) were to assault the daunting Thiepval defences, including the Schwaben and Leipzig Redoubts. The 8th and 34th Divisions (III Corps) would attack Ovillers and La Boisselle, astride the Albert-Bapaume road; XV Corps, with the 21st, 17th and 7th Divisions, was to secure Fricourt and Mametz; and on Rawlinson's right, next to the French, the 18th and 30th Divisions (XIII Corps) would capture Montauban. North and south of the River Somme itself, General Fayolle's French Sixth Army would assist the British advance by attacking towards the German second position opposite Péronne, between Maurepas and Flaucourt. Should the initial assault gain its objectives, Haig aimed to burst through the German second position on the higher ground between Pozières and Ginchy and, in due course, capture the enemy third position in the Le Sars-Flers sector, thus threatening Bapaume. This might, in turn, clear the way for Hubert Gough's Reserve Army, formed on 23 May, to swing northwards, in the direction of Arras.

British planning for the Somme was muddled by fundamental differences between the operational ideas of Haig and Rawlinson. As at Loos, Haig hoped for a breakthrough; Rawlinson favoured 'bite and hold' tactics, whereby the advancing troops would consolidate gains and shatter German counter-attacks as the artillery was brought forward for the next bound. Rawlinson's object was 'to kill as many Germans as possible with the least loss to ourselves'. As Haig's subordinate, he strove to follow his chief's general directive but because Haig entrusted the detailed planning to Rawlinson - and since their differences in operational approach were neither adequately discussed nor settled - the final scheme for the assault was riddled with contradictions, faulty assumptions and misunderstandings. Rawlinson's tactical guidance to his own subordinates was equally open to different interpretations. His lingering reservations about the ability of New Army divisions to execute complicated manoeuvres were reflected in the Fourth Army Tactical Notes, issued in May 1916. Rawlinson observed that his relatively inexperienced citizen-soldiers had 'become accustomed to deliberate action based on precise and detailed orders' and recommended that the assaulting troops 'must push forward at a steady pace in successive lines', though he also stressed 'celerity of movement' and, later in the Notes, suggested that small columns making use of natural cover, 'are preferable during the preliminary stages of the advance'. He did not, however, dictate the pace at which troops crossed No Man's Land; nor did he insist on particular formations. The ambiguity of his instructions gave corps, divisional and brigade commanders scope to determine their own assault pace and formations with the unfortunate result that, in some sectors, over-rigid artillery timetables and infantry tactics were adopted.

This need not have mattered too much had the artillery been able to negate the distinct tactical advantages the Germans enjoyed on the Somme. Unhappily for the Fourth Army, the apparently irresistible week-long preliminary bombardment by 1,537 guns was inadequate to the task. It was widely anticipated that the artillery would destroy the German defences to such an extent that the initial assault would be a 'walk-over' and the pace of the advance therefore immaterial. In reality the number of heavy guns (467) proved too few, they relied too heavily on shrapnel rather than high explosive shells to smash trenches and cut wire, many of the rounds fired were 'duds' and the guns were spread too thinly along the front to produce the desired effect.

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Preparing for the Somme (Part 1)
The bloody first day (Part 2)
Summer on the Somme (Part 3)
Enter the tank (Part 4)
The reckoning (Part 5)

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