German Plans for Defence on the Somme

In early 1916 the German defensive system on the Somme was based on two lines; it was calculated that if the first line fell, an assault on the second line would involve the British in a time-consuming redeployment of their light and medium artillery. The two lines were between 2,000 and 4,000 yards (1,828 and 3,656m) apart and the forward defensive system was fixed on a series of defended villages interspersed with supporting redoubts and strongpoints. These villages, although largely ruined, were prepared for defence and featured mined shelters under the buildings, command posts, extensive belts of barbed wire, trenches and machine-gun positions. The second line shared many features of the first and had the added advantage of being largely on a reverse slope, out of direct observation. A particularly important component of the defensive system was a web of deep-buried telephone cables, supplemented by lamps, horns, pigeons and well-trained teams of runners as backup in the event of communications failure.

Each defensive line consisted of three or more lines of trenches providing mutual support and accommodation. This accommodation was built to resist the penetrating power of heavy artillery and German troops, generally, had the benefit of deeply excavated dugouts. Work on the deepest dugouts had not begun until the spring of 1916 and although some shelters were at least 32ft (10m) deep with multiple entrances, some interconnected by tunnels, there was still work to be done in this area. Abundant wire had been placed in belts and full use was made of natural features such as Y Ravine at Beaumont Hamel. Redoubts were created which were largely capable of all-round defence. In many areas German front-line positions also had the benefit of high ground to the rear. This meant that machine guns and also artillery observers could see both no-man's land and the area likely to be occupied if an Allied attack was initially successful.

The result was a system of defence that was stronger than anything seen before, but one that was most fully developed north of Fricourt. To the south, the ground was so not advantageous to the defenders. In this area the German defences lacked suitable observation positions and the rear and front-line positions tended to be closer together. One element of German tactical doctrine that could favour the attackers was immediate counter-attack to prevent ground being lost. Consequently, in many areas front-line positions were relatively heavily held by German troops. This feature of German doctrine favoured the attackers as it concentrated troops in the area under the most intense bombardment, resulting in heavier casualties than was necessary. To be successful the German defenders had to be able to survive any preliminary shelling and still be able to man their trenches before the attackers could cross no-man's land and enter the trench system.

However, even if this happened the machine guns with direct observation could engage the attackers from the rear positions and the artillery could either open fire under orders from forward observation officers, or simply fire onto pre-arranged positions either on their own trenches or as a curtain in no-man's land. Therefore, initially successful attacking troops would be cut off from reinforcement or re-supply. The Germans rehearsed these procedures intensively in the months before the battle.

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